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Were the Neoplatonists Idealists or Realists?
by John Bussanich 
University of New México 
SAGP, Pacific APA, March 27,1992
It has become increasingly common during the past decadë to encounter idealist interpretations of 
the Greek Neoplatonists. This development is more im portant, from a scholarly point of view, than the 
confident assertions by Berkeley in the Stris or Hegel in the Encyclopaedia that the N eoplatonists 
were already prom ulgating in  late antiquity their own respective forms of idealism. One concern that 
prom pts the present inquiry is, therefore, whether we too indulge in anachronism when we employ 
terms like 'idealism ' and 'realism ' (or even 'universais' and 'particulars'1) when talking about Greek 
philosophers. In general, I think it is legitimate—in any case, it's inevitable—to attem pt an overall 
estimate of the metaphysical tenor of Neoplatonism, as long as we resist the tem ptation to crown the 
effort w ith a neat taxonomy of their ontologies and epistemologies. Diagnoses by several recent 
interpreters that individual Neoplatonists—especially Plotinus and Porphyry—are idealists or 
manifest idealistic (or generally antirealist) tendencies articulate fruitful approaches to many of the 
most intransigent exegetical problems in  Neoplatonic studies. I should like first, then, to take an 
inventory of the various indications of idealism or antirealism  recently detected, noting the 
Neoplatonic ways of thinking or positions these rubrics aim to characterize. Then, since it has not been 
done systematically, the suitability of applying idealist criteria will be matched against the sort of 
realist principles that are commonly attributed to Plato. Most attention will be directed to Plotinus 
(205-270 C.E.), w ith brief appearances by Porphyry (232-c. 305). As a counterpoint, Produs (412-485) 
will be called occasionally to speak for the later Athenian school of Neoplatonism, which is widely 
held to m aintain an extreme form of metaphysical realian.
To specify the limits of this investigation it should be noted that besides numerous varieties of 
idealism and realism there are two rather distinct uses of realism. On the first realism is opposed to 
phenomenalism; this opposition will be the primary focus of the discussion. The second concerns the 
difference between realism and nominalism about 'universels', which I intend to address on another 
occasion.2 The two forms of realism often go together, even if it is correct, as Dummett points out, that 
nominalists need not be antirealists; still, it is noteworthy that some idealistic readings of 
Neoplatonism detect nominalism as well, most notably A.C. Lloyd's.3
The most general reason for characterizing Neoplatonists as idealists is their uncompromising 
insistence that reality is transcendental, supersensible, and spiritual, and that the sensible world 
depends for its existence on the intelligible world.4 On this antim aterialistic principle (first 
described as "idealist" by Leibniz) Plato too is an idealist, not to mention theists of various stripes.5
1 Even if in the end one does not agree with his claims, it is therapeutic to entertain the doubts raised by 
Turnbull about assuming that Plato and Aristotle work with a fully articulated distinction between universale and 
particulars; cf. his 1985,24-25.
2 Dummett 1978, xxxi.
3 See Dummett 1963, T47. Lloyd's Neoplatonic nominalism (see Uoyd 1955-1956,58ff. and 1990,68-95) 
exemplifies the theoretical possibility adumbrated by Frede: "Realism in this original sense, where the genera and
species of objects also are res not nomina, of course, res of a special kind, is a view which, it seems to me, has 
recently been hardly considered, though it was the dominant view, in one form or another from late antiquity to 
Abelard's time. What is not at issue is whether there are things like Platonic ideas because these can also be 
accepted by nominalists, as being ideas in the divine mind" (Frede 1978,367n3). Though space is lacking to argue 
the point it seems to me that a divine-ideas theory need not be nominalist.
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Few would dispute ascribing idealism in this sense to the Neoplatonists. At any rate it does not 
challenge the sweeping claim made by Bernard Williams, and echoed by Myles Bumyeat, that 
idealism is not to be found in the ancient world. Williams has it that Greek philosophers did not 
arrive at the view—held by some modem philosophers—"according to which the entire world consists 
of the contents of m ind," the position he distinguishes from the perspective dominant in antiquity, that 
the material world is formed and governed by the mind.6 On the basis of this distinction. Neoplatonic 
immaterialism unam biguously exemplifies this familiar and readily understandable form of mind- 
dependence.
When considering the shadowy status of matter, particularly in Plotinus and Porphyry, some 
interpreters subscribe to the stronger thesis that m atter does not exist. Michael W agner stressses 
Plotinus' "strongly idealistic denial of matter" (1986,59), Irw in the "unreality" of m atter, one aspect of 
his quasi-em piricist interpretation of Plotinus (1989,188). Lloyd observes that in presenting his theory 
of causation Proclus "finds it almost superfluous to mention matter" and that m atter is "at m ost...a name 
for the logical substrate and is reducible to co-causes" (1990,104,119). For Porphyry, on Lloyd's view, 
the embodiment of the soul is an "illusion," as is "the 'descent' of the forms into nature."7 
Correlatively, the insubstantiality of sensible objects suggests two additional theses. In Plotinus, for 
example, the unreality of m atter leaves open the possibility that material particulars are nothing but 
bundles of properties.8 Considerable evidence supports this view, as w e'll see, but the additional 
claim is more controversial: namely, that the bundles of qualities comprising sensible particulars 
depend for their existence somehow on their being apprehended by our sense-organs. A particularly 
striking formulation of this stronger thesis is offered by Irwin who argues that "perceptible properties 
are simply appearances, not properties of the external m atter in its own right" (1989,188). A systematic 
examination of the ontological status of either m atter or sensible particulars for various Neoplatonists 
is beyond the scope of this paper. But it will be useful to see how claims about the unreality of the 
material world have encouraged idealistic readings of Plotinus and other Neoplatonists.
Now if it is relatively uncontroversial to characterize all Neoplatonists—and here, at least, one 
m ight simply go w ith Platonists—as metaphysical idealists or im m aterialists, i.e, that the material 
world is a product of transcendental realities— the ascription to some of them of explicit arguments for
4 From this perspective, Plotinus is "one of the greatest idealists of all time," since "the world of sense 
has merely a second-rate reality" in comparison with the "unperceived world of concepts" (Pistorius 1952,1). 
Similarly, Wagner 1986,57: "Plotinus' Neoplatonism is strongly idealistic. It not only adopts immaterial principles 
as its true causes, but it also denies any positive reality to m atter.... the sensible world owes its existence and 
nature solely to the hypostases, renouncing even Plato's receptacle of Becoming." (The status of matter w ill be 
discussed below in greater detail.) Moreover, he claims that for Plotinus "our cosmos is nothing but an effect of 
the hypostases' vertical causation" (59). For another illuminating discussion of immaterial causation in Plotinus 
and Proclus see Barnes 1983. Barnes believes that "the chief precursors of Berkeleianism are to be found among 
the Platonists" (170), but he stops short of invoking idealism.
5 Hamlyn puts it well: "Plato's so-called Idealism is...a  theory to the effect that sensible things, the 
objects of perception, are to be explained by reference to Ideas or Forms, the ideal entities postulated by Plato " 
(Hamlyn 1984,15n4).
6 Williams 1981,204-05 and Bumyeat 1982, discussed below in some detail.
7 Lloyd 1990,136; 1967,288,293. Particularly in the earlier study Lloyd develops the notion that Porphyry 
departs from Plotinus in "telescoping" the second and third hypostases, that is to say, reducing the soul, and its 
"creation" the material world, to appearances of the intelligible world. His interpretation is based in large part on 
a rather speculative reading of a brief passage in Porphyry Sententiae xl Lamberz. While I admire the flair Lloyd's 
'illusionist' interpretation brings to this aspect of Porphyry's thought, I prefer the less exciting, but more likely, 
position that Porphyry is quite close to Plotinus, on which see Wallis 1972,112-13.
8 Originally presented in Lloyd 1955-56, with supporting discussions by Strange 1981,185-89, Sorabji 
1983,292-93 and 1988,50-52.
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epistemological idealism  is controversial and problematic. It is im pörtant to note, first, that idealistic 
explanations of how and what we apprehend (whether by perception or intellection) may pertain to 
two different sorts of objects, viz. intelligibles and sensibles, or, at least, to two different ways of 
apprehending the same objects. All epistemological configurations cannot be canvassed here, but we 
should recall that as Platonists these philosophers inevitably characterize quite differently these two 
modes of apprehension. (Recall the combinations of Kant's empirical realism and transcendental 
idealism , and Berkeley's empirical idealism and transcendental realism.) Thus, it w ill be necessary to 
consider Neoplatonic attitudes toward perception of an external material w orld, but also tow ard the 
direct intellectual "perception" of the Forms.
The analysis of Plotinus' theory of perception has convinced some that knowledge of—and perhaps 
even the existence of—sensible objects is completely dependent on us. Irwin, for example, claims that 
from the reality of form and the unreality of m atter Plotinus "infers that the only reality is m ind- 
dependent, essentially an object of awareness for some soul" (1989,189). Others who discern idealistic 
tendencies in Plotinus' accounts of our relation to the sensible world indude Strange (1981,143) and 
W agner (1982). W agner's description is particularly vivid (he's talking about iv.4.23): "But w h a t the 
object thereby is—w h a t it is a physical copy of—depends solely upon the discernment" (19); “qua 
discerned, the object just ts as I discern it to he and it is nothing beyond what I discern it to he" (20). 
Moreover, invoking the provocative terminology of 'appearance & reality' he asserts that for Plotinus 
"the m ultiplicity which we are tempted to attribute to perceptibles is apparent only and not real" (31). 
Finally, he, like others, claims that sensibles lack essential properties: "Being a perceptible is not a 
defining characteristic of a certain set of Plotinian entities but an acddental characteristic which 
beings possess insofar as we discern them by means of sense organs" (36).9 Irw in's briefer (and less 
carefully argued) assessment amounts to a strongly subjectivist interpretation of Plotinus' theory of 
perception and the reality of sensibles;10 he leaves the impression that sensibles have no extra-mental 
reality, whereas W agner (and cf. Strange 1981,150-51) construe mind-dependence less radically.
The ontological dependence of thé sensible world on toe intelligible, or supersensible, is, as we 
have seen, essential to toe contention that Neoplatonists are metaphysical idealists or 
immaterialists. But this interpretive principle can be construed as overlapping w ith or even as 
expressing a type of epistemological idealism, when supersensible reality is some sort of mind, which 
would seem to be toe case for Neoplatonists. Strange describes Plotinus' version as "causal 
idealism /'according to which "all of sensible reality becomes m ind-dependent in a causal way" (1981, 
150), a theory that he distinguishes from Berkeley's. Yet he still wants to argue that "toe mind 
somehow causes toe being of sensibles." Specifically, it is soul that acts as a productive cause, projecting 
logoi as immanent forms into a materialized state.11 Soul is toe vehicle by which Forms as (formal)
9 I have given only Wagner's conclusions to a series of detailed analyses, while ignoring (for lack of 
space) his carefully nuanced arguments. Moreover, as I read the claims quoted here they do not impute to 
Plotinus the Berkeleyan claim that esse est percipi. One of the purposes of the author's italics in these passages 
is, I think, to assert the ontological priority of the sensible form qua discerned, not to claim the latter's utter lack of 
existence. This would seem to be his position as stated elsewhere. Referring to the "non-reality of sensible 
objects" in iii.6.12, Wagner clarifies in a note that by "calling them 'non-real', Plotinus does not deny the existence 
of sensible objects or their appearances" (1985,273 with 290n7).
10 Irwin bolsters his claim that perceptible properties are mere appearances with a reference to 
Berkeley's Siris (1989,188nl0). Here, it seems to me, he rather uncritically follows Sorabji 1983,293, who too closely 
assimilates Plotinus' bundle-particulars to those of Gregory of Nyssa (discussed below), and, with the addition of 
Gregory's assertion that matter is non-existent but is only a thought, Berkeley is added to the picture. Irwin's 
interpretations are noteworthy, despite the dearth of careful argumentation for which he is well-known, because 
they appear in what may become one of the standard surveys of Greek philosophy.
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causes become present in their sensible (and psychic) effects. Notice how in Corrigan's formulation of 
this process im material causation develops into a version of epistemological idealism: "As demiurgic 
soul we create the object; as perceptive soul we give it logos or am ply qualify it further....In a real 
sense, therefore, it is 'ourselves' who generate not only substrata (to the degree that they áre formed) 
but also universals, quality and quantity."12 It remains to be determined w hat is the referent of 
'ourselves' in this sort of reading,1* a challenge that surfaces as well in  the various idealisms 
attributed to Plotinus and Porphyry by Lloyd.
Now Lloyd directly raises the question about what soft of idealism we should find in Plotinus 
(1990,173,177; cf. also 95,126). Despite being rather undogmatic about his judgm ents in this regard (as 
well as confusingly unsystematic in his discussion of the idealistic tendencies in Plotinus), Lloyd 
provides cogent arguments for the mind-dependence of both sensible and intelligible reality. A key 
facet of the former sort emerges in Lloyd's interpretation of iii.8 On Nature, Contemplation and thé 
One. He begins by interpreting (his word) θεωρία as "consciousness." Roughly the first half of this 
treatise is fertile territory indeed for Lloyd's purposes, for here nature, soul, and then Intellect "create" 
by means of increasingly real and truer degrees of θεωρία. And, strikingly, w hat are created also seem 
to be forms of θεωρία. These are Lloyd's central points (1990,182-84):
a. perfection is identical with consciousness
b. thinking is identical w ith consciousness
c. "every real thing is a thought"
d. "a true thought is not just an object of thought but the thinking of it"
e. this am ounts to "a thought without a thinking subject...a strange idea" thát is "often attributed 
to eighteenth-century idealists"
f. both the universal Intellect and we individual human minds are creative qua the degree of 
consciousness or thought excerdsed
g. "when Nous creates it can be seen as the spontaneous multiplication of reality"
Taken together these features of the Plotinian theory of consciousness, if we may call it such, convince 
Lloyd that Plotinian idealism  is closer to Hegel's than to Kant's. (Earlier in  the book he rejects 
describing Plotinus as a subjective idealist: 134). In Plotinus at least Lloyd sees "consciousness 
überhaupt."
11 Strange 1981,146 provides a succinct account: "it is soul which is the proximate productive cause of 
sensibles. The Forms are causes of sensibles only at second remove: both because as nous they are the productive 
cause of soul, which is proximate cause of sensibles, and because they contribute to the being of sensibles by 
providing soul with the logoi by which it produces sensibles." It should be noted, however, that often Plotinus 
"shrinks" the catisal chain by emphasizing the direct presence of the intelligibles, or Forms, in sensibles. The two 
alternatives are framed in this passage: "Are we then going to maintain that it [τό παν = Intelligible Being] is 
present itself, or that it is on its own but powers from it come to all things, and this is why it is said to be 
everywhere? For in this way they say that the souls are like rays, so that it is set firm in itself but the soul-rays sent 
out come now to one living thing and now to another" (vi.4.3.1-6, tr. Armstrong & unless indicated otherwise). The 
direct presence of the intelligible to the sensible is stressed too in passages like vi.5.8.17-22 where Plotimis argues 
that there is "nothing between" the Form and matter. See Wagner 1986,65ff. for an incisive discussion of the 
complexities in Plotinus' theory of participation.
12 Corrigan 1981,118, author's italics. Cf. also Lloyd 1990,134: "the logoi which are sometimes called the 
'seminal' logoi have the task of conveying the proceeding forms to their recipients."
13 Corrigan refers to several passages to support his talk about "creation." iii.3.4.37-40 does speak about 
qualifying sensible objects, but not about 'creating them'; in any case, the causal agents under discussion are 
λόγοι, ii.6.3 addresses the issue of the dependence of sensible qualities on intelligible qualities, not the former's 
'creation by us'. More significantly, the dramatic passage at vi.2.21.11-59 envisions the 'creation' or generation of 
Forms, categories, universals, intelligible qualities etc. by the Universal Intellect—but not by 'ourselves'. Thus, it is 
crucial to discover what or who is the creative cause. Scare-quotes cannot bear the metaphysical weight that here 
is placed upon them.
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Though Lloyd seems unaware of the fact, his Hegelian version of Plotinus was tendered long ago, if 
rather sketchily and less convincingly. For the great French Plotinus scholar Émile Bréhier Hegel's 
interpretation of Plotinus as an absolute idealist is on the mark. Like Lloyd Bréhier argues that the 
Forms are thoughts: the Forms are "modes or states of Intelligence and no longer things"; for "nothing 
like things exists in true reality. There exist only subjects which contemplate"; "the forms of the real 
cannot be considered inert realities existing independently of the spiritual activities which posed 
them" (Bréhier 1928,192,196). These comments, however brief, seem rather close to Lloyd's more 
comprehensive interpretation, which can be summed up in his phrase: "the hypostases a re experiences" 
(Lloyd 1990,126).
This cursory survey of mostly recent discussions of forms of Neoplatonic idealism is necessarily 
partial and incomplete, but the following seem to be the most prom inent features. (1) the material 
w orld's dependence on and derivation from the supersensible. (2) the unreality or non-existence of 
matter. (3) the dependence of the reality of sensible properties on being perceived. (4) the 
insubstantiality of material particulars. (5) the argument that infers from the causal dependence of the 
sensible world on the intelligible that sensibles are mind-dependent. (6) the notion that Forms and 
Being are thoughts, which, in turn, are perfect states of consciousness.
Before testing some of these interpretations, consider the objections to finding idealism  in the 
ancient world registered by Bumyeat. He argues that Greek philosophers entertained no skeptical 
doubts about the existence of the material world and hence did not confront the problem of proving its 
existence. Idealism does not become a live possibility, he suggests, until, in the wake of Cartesian 
doubt, the question whether there is anything besides mind becomes the central philosophical 
problem.14 15Many of the idealistic readings we have considered do depend, it seems to me, on a less 
radical form ulation of this view, insofar as they assume an appearance vs. reality distinction. Lloyd, 
for example, argues that for the Neoplatonists reality is being or thought, whereas the psychic and 
material worlds are mere appearances; but, he adds, being's "appearances are not illusions" (1990,138). 
If pressed hard enough the caveat undermines the strongly idealistic reading of the Neoplatonists 
inasmuch as it empties "appearance" of the meaning it bears in modem and contemporary philosophy. 
If, in fact, the lower degrees of reality are not illusory appearances for the Neoplatonists, it is 
m isleading to think of them as appearances o f tire higher orders of being.is Lloyd waffles a bit, 
perhaps, when he offers that "Neoplatonism is only half reductionist, since while it is a philosophy of 
appearance and reality, the appearance cannot be dispensed with" (1990, 95-96). I w ant to press his 
final point further than he would wish, arguing that Plotinus' idealistic tendencies are considerably 
weaker than he supposes, and that they fail to undermine his basic realist assumptions. Now to test 
this general hypothesis on the various topics considered in  the first part of the paper.
First, the unreality of m atter—a key part of the argument for idealistic tendencies in the
14 Bumyeat 1982,19,33. In what follows I work from his point that "What I have ascribed to antiquity is 
an unquestioned, unquestioning assumption of realism: something importantly different from an explicit 
philosophical thesis" (33, his italics). For some doubts about Bumyeat's threshhold for acknowledging the 
presence of idealism see Sorabji 1983,288.
15 A stimulating comparison of modem idealisms with Platonism is made by Hardie 1936,168-69: "The 
relation of the Absolute to its 'appearances' is not that of the One to its 'emanations'. The relation of the One to 
what 'proceeds' from it, mind and its objects, is one of dependence; the relation of the Absolute to is appearances 
is one of inclusion. The Argument for a Noumenon or 'supra-rational Absolute' rests on contradictions alleged of 
certain categories of thinking, and involves rejecting as appearance all that we commonly take for real. But 
Neoplatonism does not assert that minds or even bodies are other than they appear to us to be. It does not argue 
that to judge that they exist is false." For another statement that the Neoplatonists ultimately avoid the 
appearance-reality distinction cf. Dodds 1963,217.
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Neoplatonists. I am not convinced that Plotinus has a consistent theory of matter; at the same time, it 
seems to me a mistake to suggest, as Irwin does, that, because Plotinus, for example, defines m atter as 
non-being, privation, real falsity, and pure indeterminacy,16 he thinks m atter is an "illusion," that 
Plotinus "refuses it a place among the realities," and that he "denies it a degree of independent 
reality" (1989,194-95). Setting aside the current disputes concerning the generation of matter,17 for the 
purposes of the present discussion we need only recall that m atter derives from the activity of the 
cosmic Soul (cf. v.1.7.47-48; v.2.1.17-18, ii.3.18.10-13, ii.4.5, ii.5.5). The question is: once "generated" 
what sort of ontological status does Plotinus assign to sensible matter? It is well known that he follows 
Aristotle in identifying m atter (i.e., the prim e m atter that underlies the physical elements) w ith 
Plato's Receptacle (ii.4.1; so too Porphyry: cf. Lloyd 1967,292). In fact, throughout his discussions of the 
nature of m atter Plotinus repeatedly refers to the Timaeus or echoes the dialogue's account of the 
Receptacle. In his assertion that m atter is οποίος, Plotinus is closely following Tim. 50d-51a. We need 
only juxtapose a few passages from the Enneads w ith these essential characterizations of the 
Receptacle from the Timaeus: "It must be called always the same; for it never departs a t all from its 
own character; since it is always receiving all things, and never in any way whatsoever takes on any 
character that is like ariy of the things that enter it" (50b6-c2); "it is free from all those characters 
which it is to receive from elsewhere" (50d7-el); "that which is to receive in itself all kinds m ust be 
free from all characters" (50e4-5); "we call it a nature invisible and characterless, all-receiving, 
partaking in some very puzzling way of the intelligible and very hard to apprehend" (51a7-b2);
"Space, which is everlasting, not adm itting destruction; providing a situation for all things that come 
into being, but itself apprehended without the senses by a sort of bastard reasoning" (52a8-b2, tr. 
Comford).
§ i.8.10.2-5: "it [sc. matter] is called 'w ithout quality' because it has in its own right none of the 
qualities which it is going to receive and which are going to be in it as their substrate, but not in the 
sense that it has no nature at all." (For m atter as αποιος cf. also ii.4.7.11, 8.1-2; vi.1.26.10.)
§ M atter is incorporeal (iii.6.7.4), invisible (iii.6.7.14; 13.40); as in Tim. 50c4-5, im itations—phantoms 
in Plotinus' phrasing—appear in it (iii.6.7.25-30); m atter is indestructible (iii.6.8.12, ii.9.3.16) and 
unchangeable (iii.6.10.25-29); m atter m ust exist as a base (*εδρα) for sensible appearances (iii.6.14.7-8). 
In certain respects Plotinus departs from or embellishes the description of the Receptacle—as when he 
compares it to a mirror in which things appear (iii.6.13.49)—but this cursory comparison of passages 
indicates that the Plotinian position is close to the Platonic. It would be a mistake to conclude that 
Plotinian m atter does not exist because for him (and for Plato as well) though m atter lacks being, it 
exists as an independent explanatory factor in Plotinus' metaphysics of Becoming. Hence the insistence 
that m atter is an αιτία της γενέσεως (fix.6.14.35), an αιτία άλλοις του φαίνεσθαι (iii.6.15.27).18 Matter 
is independent not in the sense that it does not do ive  from or depend on immaterial causes, but rather in 
that it does exist as a dim  sort of reality that has effects on the nature of the material world and on 
hum an life.19
A particularly striking way in which the independent existence of m atter is asserted is the evil 
effects it causes, the prim aiy topic of i.8: "m atter is the cause of the soul's weakness and vice: it is then 
itself evil before soul and is primary evil. Even if soul had produced matter, being affected in some
16 Irwin 1989,244nl2 accurately refers to ii.4.14,16.3; ii.5.4.11-12; ii.5.5.25-26.
17 For an illuminating recent discussion see Corrigan 1986.
18 Cf. the excellent discussion by Strange 1981,122-23,136-37 to which I am indebted. Note also Corrigan: 
"matter is 'positive' in genesis, for it is comprehended by form; but, as matter, it goes beyond conceptualization 
and exhibits a fundamental identity with privation in the sense of absence and even negativity' (1987-1988,105-06).
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way, and had become evil by communicating with it, m atter would have been the cause by its presence: 
soul would not have come to it unless its presence had given soul the occasion of coming to birth" 
(i.8.14.50-54). This explanation makes clear that despite the generation of m atter ]by soul (qua 
hypostasis), m atter remains an independent factor in the operations of the cosmos. ;In some passages 
matter even becomes almost anti-substance (see i.8.6.31-59, iii.6.1735-37). Thus, I ¡dispute Irw in's 
contention that, because soul (in some sense) is responsible for the generation of màtter, and hence evil, 
that m atter lacks independent existence.20 If matter amounts to anti-substance and it is one of the 
prim ary causes of evil, neither prime m atter nor the proximate, elemental m atter constitutive of 
sensible composites should be reducible to other entities—either soul or sense-data.21
If a strongly idealistic denial of matter is not to be found in Plotinus, we still might agree with 
Sorabji that such a radical claim is made by certain Christian Neoplatonists, the Greek Cappadocian 
Fathers Gregory and Basil. Sorabji cites three fascinating passages in which Gregory claims that 
material bodies consist only of qualities, which are nothing but ideas. Interestingly, in his discussion 
Sorabji ignores the suggestions made by Hilary Armstrong, first, that the non-existence of 
m atter—inferred in part from the claim that material particulars are merely bundles of qualities—is 
explicitly proposed by one of Plotinus' imaginary interlocutors, but rejected by Plotinus; second, that 
Basil and Gregoty may have come to their view about m atter from reading this very passage in the 
Enneads.72
W ith Plotinus too there is considerable evidence that he maintained a version of bundle- 
particulars. Lloyd first called attention to this many years ago and he has been followed by many. As 
Lloyd points out. Neoplatonic bundle-particulars derive from Timaeus 49-50 and Theaetetus 157b.23 At 
vi.3.8.20-21 sensible substance is described by Plotinus as σομφόρησις τις ποιοτήτων καί ΰλης; sim ilarly. 
Porphyry defines individuals as ιδιοτήτων άθροισμα (Isagoge vii.21-23; Lloyd 1955-1956,158).
W hatever Plotinus' views are on the ontology of the sensible object,24 what is im portant here is to 
determine, first, whether the qualities or attributes that comprise sensibles are independent of our 
minds. And second, are these immanent forms, the substantial properties of sensibles, internal or 
external to the mind? Now sensible qualities are the result of (or are identical to) the activities of
19 It is not unlikely that Plotinus read that puzzling phrase in the T im a eu s  about the Receptacle's 
"participation ini the intelligible" as indicating the former's ontological derivation from the latter. The claim that 
"matter is a sort of ultimate form" (v.8.7.22-23) might hint at this. Given the 'mythic7 character of the discourse in 
the dialogue, inferring from the etem ality of the Receptacle that it is also a non-derived entity is questionable. I 
would also endorse Corrigan's suggestion that when Plotinus suggests that matter somehow participates in the 
intelligible he thinks he is following T im . 51a: see Corrigan 1986,177 & n28.
20 Irwin admits that if matter has an evil "effect on the soul, it seems to have real causal influence." But 
he avoids confronting the textual evidence in what follows: "If, however, the soul's self-assertion is the origin of evil, 
and if matter is an illusion, a figment of a deceived and self-assertive soul, its role in evil seems very slight." And 
finally: "We might infer that the bad aspects of the world result from the recalcitrance of matter, and the good 
aspects from the presence of reason. But this conclusion would accord to matter a degree of independent reality 
that Plotinus denies it" (Irwin 1989,195).
21 Cf. Dummett 1963,156-57.
22 The passage is ii.4.11.1-14. See Armstrong's note ad loc. in his Loeb edition and also his 1962. He also 
points out that the objection—that matter does not exist—is also stated at the beginning of i.8.15, which refers 
back to ii.4.11.
23 Lloyd 1955-1956,62ff.; Strange, 1981,185-89; Rist 1967,105-11. Cf. also Lloyd 1990,46 for differences 
among the Neoplatonist bundle theories.
24 See Strange's valuable discussion of whether Plotinus' sensible particulars are bundles of particulars 
or of universale: 1981,186-87. In general I agree with Turnbull's assertion that Plotinus's theory of predication 
closely follow s Plato's and that his account of the sensible world closely follows the T im a eu s: see Turnbull 1985, 
43-44. It's a mystery to me why this important study continues to be neglected by Neoplatonic scholars.
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logoi, which separate off images of intelligible forms and im plant them  on or in m atter (ii.6.1-2). The 
true being of a thing is in its intelligible logos; sensible being is merely an im itation or shadow of the 
intelligible (vi.3.8.27-30).
In his argum ent that for Plotinus sensibles and their properties are m ind-dependent Irwin (1989, 
188) d tes the last two lines of the following passage:
For there is a lack of confidence about even those objects of sense-perception which seem to inspire 
the strongest confidence in their self-evidence, whether their apparent existence may be not in the 
underlying realities, but in  thé ways the sense-organs are affected, and they need intellect or 
discursive reason to make judgments about them; for even if it is agreed that they are in the 
underlying sense-realities which sense-perception is to grasp, that which is known by sense- 
perception is an image of the filing, and sense-perception does not apprehend the thing itself: for 
that rem ains outside (τό τε γινωσκόμενον Si’ αίσθήσεως του πράγματος εΐδωλόν έστι και ουκ αυτό 
το πράγμα ή αΐσθησις λαμβάνει- μένει γάρ εκείνο εξω.). (ν.5.1.12-20).
O ther passages as well have been adduced as evidence of Plotinus' antirealist position, notably i.1.7.25 
N ote first that this passage states directly that there is something external to the senses and the mind, 
raising doubts about the supposed "unreality of sensibles" or the notion that everything m ust be an 
object of awareness for some soul, that is to say, that Plotinus unambiguously subscribes to some form of 
phenomenalism. On the contraiy, Plotinus shares the basic attitude of Plato or Aristotle tow ards the 
reality of the external world: no Cartesian doubts plague his surprisingly detailed accounts of 
perception and file sensible world.26 However, the existence of m aterial particulars that are 
independent of the mind goes along with the derivation of sensibles' quasi-being from their intelligible 
originals.
If Plotinus avoids explicit antirealism, is he a perceptual realist? Emilsson (1988,120) has argued 
recently that Plotinus' theory of perception is a form of direct realism, according to which sense- 
perception grasps the qualities or accidental properties (i.e., images of the forms) of the sensible object; 
while the essence is apprehended internally by the soul in contact w ith the intelligible forms. But the 
derivative, imagistic nature of the immanent qualities is an objective feature of sensibles, and these are 
in fact "grasped in themselves" in the act of perception.27 (Evident here is Plotinus' Platonized version 
of the Aristotelian reception of the form without the m atter in de An. iii.4 & 7; cf. Emilsson 1988, 7). In 
fact, unlike the passage from v.5.1 cited above, Plotinus elsewhere argues against a  representational 
theory of perception while continuing to maintain the causal role of the sensible object in perception. In 
iv.6.1, for example, he claims that when the soul looks at a sensible object "no impression has been or is 
being im printed on i t  For there would have been no need for it to look outwards, if it already had in it 
the form of the viable object...M ost im portant of all: if we received impressions of what we see, there 
will be no possibility of looking at file actual things we see, but we shall look at images and shadows of
25 "And soul's power of perception need not be perception of sense-objects, but rather it must be 
receptive of the impressions produced by sensation on the living being; these are already intelligible entities. So 
external sensation is the image of this perception of the soul, which is in its essence truer and is a contemplation of 
forms alone without being affected" (i.1.7.9-14). For antirealist readings of this passage see Blumenthal 1971,71-72 
and Zeller 1903,637-38.
24 Cf. Turnbull 1985,47: "Neither Plotinus nor, for that matter, any early Greek philosopher betrays any 
sort of Cartesian problem concerning the status and place of sensed colors, sounds, hards, softs, flavors etc." See 
also Emilsson 1988,3% 145-48.
27 The following passage presents a very different picture than that suggested by v.5.1: "the soul must 
somehow be connected with sense-objects through things which are very much like them and establish a sort of 
communion of knowledge or affection with them....through these [sense-organs], which are in a way naturally 
united to or continuous with sense-objects, the soul must somehow in some way come to a unity with the sense- 
objects themselves" (iv.5.1.7-13).
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the objects of sight, so that the objects themselves will be different from the things we see" (iv.6.1.19- 
32).28 This passage illustrates the rather uncomplicated naturalism  to which Plotinus sometimes 
subscribes when he talks about the sensible world w ithout any consideration of the intelligible world. 
Hence, the subjectivist tone of v.5.1 (& i.1.7) may derive largely from the sharp contrast Plotinus wants 
to draw  there between sensation and intellection. Despite these challenges to antirealist readings of 
Plotinus, it is perhaps going too far to describe him as a consistent direct realist about perception of the 
material world as does Emilsson, for some passages sound representationalist.29 We must now confront 
the same nest of problems in the intelligible world.
It is, of course, on the intelligible level, Plotinus claims, that we can know real being in itself, the 
real essence of things.30 The knowledge of the essences of things, afforded by the direct intellectual 
intuition of intelligible Forms, grounds Plotinus' theory of perception, on which there is an exact fit 
between the sense-organs and material particulars, specifically, their accidental properties. Grasping 
essences in themselves, however, requires ascent to the intelligible, at which point one achieves—very 
literally for a Platonist—the 'god's eye view'.31 On this sort of transcendental realism, Plotinus treats 
the Forms as celestial paradigms, the productive source of instantiated properties—both 'substantial' 
(i.e., images of real, intelligible substance) and accidental.32 But the identity between Forms and minds 
on the intelligible level—portrayed in the passage cited above (cf. also v.3.5.17-23, v.3.8, 
v.8.4)—seems to lead to the conclusion that reality is indeed mind-dependent, or rather that reality is 
Mind. The aspiration, even the expectation, tirât one can become the Intellect or Universal Mind 
(vi.7.15.1-2) (this, Plotinus' position, is considered wildly optimistic by Proclus and Iamblichus, for 
example), lends considerable support to Lloyd's contention that "the hypostases are experiences; they 
are types of consciousness; while, therefore, they have abstract and objective properties, they have 
also what we call phenomenologocial properties" (1990,126). Hence, "all the elements in the 
Neoplatonic hierarchy are thoughts" (134). First, a terminological point. Though he knows as well as 
anyone that νόησις, as non-discursive thought, is distinct from our ordinary notion of knowing, Lloyd 
continues to employ "thought" to render the Greek term, notwithstanding its transcendental and 
non-propositional character.33 This practice gives a false impression of the similarity of normal (or 
discursive) and supersensible mental states, recalling also his identification of θεωρία w ith  
consciousness. Lloyd, it seems to me, is making a valiant effort to hint at the "intellectual"
28 Cf. Turnbull 1985, 75n83: "No Platonist would dream of putting sensations, the results of causal 
interactions of the physical environment with sense-organs, 'in the mind' nor for that matter 'in' the soul."
29 I agree with some of Modrak's objections to Emilsson's thesis. While admitting, with Emilsson, that 
Plotinus' theory of perception is "arguably a causal theory" she asserts that it is "an eccentric one since the causal 
chain is psychic not physical and the object perceived-is necessary but not sufficient to bring about the 
perception"; thus for her "it does not appear to be a form of direct realism." On the other hand, her claim that "the 
soul is in direct contact only with the sensory affection" is too inexact to explain the passage from iv.6.1 cited 
above. And in the following—also relevant to iv.6.1— her definition o f realism is perhaps too "scientific": "If the 
quality in the organ were identical to the quality in matter, the account would be realist, however the quality in the 
organ is only similar to the quality in matter and thus the claim that the quality in the organ is what is directly 
apprehended defeats the claim to realism." (All quotes from Modrak 1989,113). Note that Modrak does not quote 
or discuss any of Plotinus' specific terms or descriptions.
30 A succinct statement is the often discussed v.5.2: "since one must bring in knowledge and truth and 
watchfully preserve reality and the knowledge of what each thing is—but not only the knowledge of each thing's 
qualities, since if we only had that we should have an image and a trace of realities, and not possess and live with 
and be fused with the realities themselves" (v.5.2.5-9).
31 Cf. Putnam 1983,209,225.
32 Cf. Armstrong 1978,71,75-76.
33 For his remarks on the differences see 1990,168; see also his 1986,263 where he argues that νους too 
should be translated as "thought."
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transparency w ith in  Plotinus' intelligible world by practicing a kind of lexical transparency, or of 
discovering unm itigated identity everywhere ih the intelligible. And, analogously, he recognizes, but 
does not sufficiently stress the radical disjunction between discursive thought and awareness 
/consciousness and their noetic exemplars.341 would also emphasize more strongly than Lloyd (cf. 1990, 
181) the great difference between the empirical and the transcendental selves: the former cannot be 
said to be a 'creator of forms' except in the most derivative and inferior manner.
What does this have to do with questions about Neoplatonic idealism? First, by stressing the 
identity of νοΰς,νσησις, and νοητά, Lloyd blurs metaphysical distinctions that Plotinus wishes to 
maintain. His conclusions about "thought w ithout a thinking subject" (reminiscent of 18th century 
idealism ) and that "every real thing is a thought" (1990,182-83) open the door—in one swoop—to an 
extreme abstract impersonalism, or, paradoxically, a radical subjectivism. Developing the first 
possibility yields the (to my mind) rather unidealistic formulation: "since consciousness at its best does 
not have a thinker who is distinct from it, we cannot ask whose consciousness creates what exists" (183). 
The "thinking" engaged in by a trans-personal self eludes the sort of analysis we might apply to 
discursive reasoning or perception. If this sounds Hegelian to Lloyd, it is im portant to recall that 
Hegel's account of Plotinian Neoplatonism is notorious for focusing heavily on noetic self-identity, 
while ignoring the hyper-transcendence of the One, a tendency that surfaces now and then in Lloyd's 
own analysis.35
W hat m otivates this emphasis on noetic identity is, of course, some of Plotinus' own statements, 
like the following: "We have here, then, one nature. Intellect, all realities and truth (νους, τα δντα 
πάντα, ή άλήθεια)" (v.5.3.1-2); "for Intellect does not apprehend objects which preexist it—as sense 
does sense-objects—Intellect itself is its objects... But it is here w ith its objects and the same as and one 
w ith them" (v.4.2.44-49). Note, finally, the following passage, the first part of which is perhaps the 
strongest statement of the peculiar kind of constructivism that one can find in the Enneads; but the 
latter part (after file asterisk) casts a very different light on the whole: "But each of them [sc. the 
Forms] is Intellect and Being, and the whole is universal Intellect and Being, Intellect making Being 
exist in  thinking it, and Being giving Intellect thinking and existence by being thought.* But the cause 
of thinking is something else, which is also cause of being; they both therefore have a cause other than 
them selves" (v.1.4.26-31).36 Thus, Lloyd claims that neither Being nor Intellect is prior to the other.
He intends his interpretation to cover the generation of Intellect as well: "there can be no answer to the 
question whether it is making or discovering" its objects or contents.37 Unlike Lloyd I prefer to see 
Plotinus, and the other Neoplatonists too, describing the awakening and the activity of noetic thought 
as a process of discovery, followed by an inexpresssible fusing with what is.
34 See the excellent discussion of the difficulties of rendering νους into English by Rist 1989,190-97. Note 
his conclusion: "it seems unacceptable to limit our translation of nous to words associated primarily with thinking 
rather than with being: being, that is, in a state of awareness of metaphysical reality, or rather, for Plotinus, of the 
living spiritual reality of the universe" (197). In the end, Rist settles on "spiritual self' as the best we can do.
35 See the excellent survey of the evidence by Beierwaltes, especially 353 where he shows how Hegel 
"denatures" the Plotinian One and elevates pure thought to the supreme goal of Plotinian philosophizing.
36 'Έκαστον δέ αυτών νους καί δν έστι και το σύμπαν πας νους καί παν δν, ό μέν νους κατά το νοείν 
ΰφιστάς τδ δν, τό δέ δν τφ νοείσθαι τφ νφ διδόν τό νοείν καί το είναι. Του δέ νοείν αίτιον άλλο, δ καί τφ 
δντι· άμφοτέρων ουν &μα αίτιον άλλο.
37 Lloyd 1990,178. He identifies this explanation as specifying one aspect of Plotinus' idealism. Cp. the 
remarks of Dummett 1959,185, which, though directed to the philosophy of mathematics, are analogous to Lloyd's 
description: 'I t seems that we ought to interpose between the platonist and constructivist picture an intermediate 
picture, say of objects springing into being in response to our probing. We do not make the objects but must 
accept them as we find them...but they were not already there for our statements to be true or false of before we 
carried out the investigations which brought them into being."
30
In light of the passage from v.1.4 (and others) Lloyd's emphasis on noetic self-identity or, again, on 
the abolition of the subject-object distinction ignores the overarching causal efficacy of the One or Good 
in the generation of Intellect, as well as bracketing the role of the One in the mystical reversion.38 To 
oversimplify: Intellect's self-knowledge or self-intellection is only one phase of its life, 
notw ithstanding the universality of its noetic ένέργεια. The im portant distinction at vi.7.35.20-22 is 
relevant here: "Intellect ...has one power for thinking, by which it looks at the things in itself, and one 
by which it looks at what transcends it by a direct awareness and reception." So even if there is a 
certain kind of mind-dependence in Plotinus' intelligible world, viz. its self-reflexivity, this is only 
part of the picture. Even w ithin the intelligible sphere the priority of Being to thought is asserted 
rather strongly.39 For the full picture we still have to reckon with the crucial fact in Plotinus' thought 
that the One, qua transcendent object of thought, is ontologically prior to Intellect (see v.4.2.5-13, 
v.9.5-7, vi.5.7.1-6).40 Add to this the emphasis throughout the Neoplatonic tradition on the First 
Principle's utter inexpressibility and transcendence of all categories and thought (in Plotinus cf. 
especially vi.7.37-41), any interpretation suggesting that at the highest level reality is mind- 
dependent or is a form of thought is misleading.41 In the end there is a fundamental difference between 
the reality of the One and the activity of thought.42
38 See my 1988,159-71.
39 "For its self-directed activity is not substance, but being is that to which the activity is directed and 
from which it comes: for that which is looked at is being, not the look; but the look, too, possesses being, because it 
comes from and is directed to being" (Ή μεν γάρ ενέργεια ή εις αυτόν ούκ ουσία, εις δ δε και άφ’ ου, τό ον · τό 
γάρ βλεπόμενον τό δν, ουχ ή βλέψις* εχει δε και αυτή τό είναι, δτι άφ’ oh και εις ον, δν. vi.2.814-16).
40 On this point and with respect to the question of whether or not the Neoplatonists are idealists, I think 
Proclus' position is very similar to Plotinus'. At Elements of Theology §161 Proclus argues that "while the 
Intelligence is an existent because of primal Being, this primal Being is itself separate from the Intelligence, 
because Intelligence is posterior to Being." Proclus' "primal Being" plays, roughly, the causal role in his system  
that the One-as-intelligized does in Plotinus'; for the differences between Proclus' primal being and Plotinus' 
noetic being, i.e. internal to Intellect, cf. Dodds 1963, 281, 285.
In his exhaustive discussion of Socrates' suggestion to Parmenides that perhaps the Forms are thoughts 
(Farm, 132b), Proclus drives home from every possible angle both the transcendence of thought by a higher kind 
of being and the causal interdependence of a lower kind of being and thought within Intellect; cf. Proclus in Parm. 
891-901. In short, Proclus' view  is close to that of Plotinus' at v.1.4.26-31 and vi.2.8.14-16.
41 Lloyd is quite aware of these fundamental claims but, again, invests them with little weight—if I 
correctly understand the following elliptical and very compressed statement: "Since Intellect is what is thought as 
w ell as the thinking, we can infer that what is thought and what exists presuppose something which is neither 
thought nor existence. This is the second fact which has a bearing on Plotinus' idealism . For Existence'—more 
commonly translated as 'being'—has here the connotation which is appropriate to idealism , namely of being a 
distinct object of thought. But so far from exhausting the realist's notion of 'existence' this has turned out to 
require there to be something which does not, in Plotinus' and the idealist's terms, exist. At any rate, this 
something can have no fixed and concrete properties (for otherwise it would be an object of thought) but is there?' 
(1990,179).
42 Though his discussion is brief and general, Burnyeat's claim that we don't really find "idealism" 
among the Neoplatonists is largely justified on the grounds that (i) the duality between subject and object is not 
overcome on the level of the Intellect; and (ii) even if everything were reducible to the One, still we would not have
a monism of mind. See Burnyeat 1982,18.
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argument (353e; cf. 389a).62 Although this disengagement vitiates the educational function of the 
elenchus, it frees Socrates to take the argument wherever he wishes, winning Thrasymachus’ 
"agreement", for example, to the proposition that justice is the excellence o f the soul (353e).
At the beginning of book 2, Plato dissociates the arguments to be refuted from the personal 
character and beliefs of the interlocutors in a different way, by giving Glaucon and Adeimantus the 
role o f devil's advocates.63 Unlike Thrasymachus, who claimed to care about the question at 
issue (344e), but withdrew from sincere participation in the argument, Plato's brothers are 
committed to the argument, but not to the views under scrutiny .64 By making an eloquent case 
for a position they do not believe in, they illustrate the positive value o f intellectual disengagement. 
Socrates confesses that his aporia. caused by the brothers' dissatisfaction with his elenctic 
arguments, is exacerbated by their own detachment from the views they have put forward for his 
refutation (368ab). Since these are not their own views, he cannot use the elenchus to pick them 
apart and prove them inconsistent with the brothers' other convictions. He cannot refute the 
interlocutors themselves, in the elenctic manner, but must show what is wrong with these views 
regardless o f who holds them. As Socrates says to Phaedrus in the Phaedrus. "To you perhaps it 
makes a difference who the speaker is and where he is from. For you do not consider this alone, 
whether what he says is or is not the case." "A justifiable rebuke," says Phaedrus (Phdr. 275bc).
Glaucon and Adeimantus' philosophical talents equip them to serve as effective devil's 
advocates, who can not only criticize a point o f view but defend one as persuasively as possible, in 
order to give it a fair hearing. In this role they restate Thrasymachus' most serious charges against 
Socrates and his method. They do not accuse him o f dishonesty. They understand that his irony 
is not, as Thrasymachus thinks (337a), a form o f dissembling (cf. 362el). Yet they are no more 
convinced than Thrasymachus is by his arguments (358b, 368b). When Glaucon complains that 
Thrasymachus was silenced prematurely (358b), he implies that Socrates might have fared less 
successfully with a different interlocutor. Though Plato's brothers never accuse Socrates o f 
cheating, their restatement o f Thrasymachus' views implies that Socrates’ focus on a particular 
interlocutor has allowed him to get away with arguments which might not survive more rigorous 
scrutiny. As late as book 6, Adeimantus w ill recall the discomfort experienced by those 
respondents who cannot gainsay Socrates’ arguments yet feel they have been led astray by them 
(487bc). To prevent such discontent, the case for justice must be made not just in a way that 
silences the interlocutor, but in the most convincing manna* possible. This includes refuting not 
merely the interlocutor's arguments but the best arguments by the best speakers. Socrates 
obliquely acknowledges this when he claims to be defeated by Glaucon's case for injustice (362d), 
applauds the brothers' eloquence (368a), and confesses the magnitude o f his task in face o f their 
dissatisfaction with his previous arguments (368bc).
Glaucon and Adeimantus also restate Thrasymachus' other main complaint—that Socrates 
refuses to give a positive account o f his own views. Of the three interlocutors scrutinized in book 
1, only Thrasymachus tries to make Socrates in turn examine his ideas and assumptions about the 
subject under discussion. He points out that it is easier to ask questions than to answer them 
(336c; cf. 337e), demands a positive definition o f justice (336cd), and sneers at Socrates’ 
"wisdom" for its lack o f positive teaching (338b). At one point, he declares that he dislikes the 
argument and could answer it, but that Socrates would call his argument demagoguery (350d). In 
other words, he remains unconvinced not only by the argument but by a method which eschews 
substantial speeches. His own positive statements, including a long oration, are presented only to 
be picked apart by the elenchus. But whatever his faults, he does at least put forward substantive
62 Cf. Blundell 147 n. 74.
63 Socrates explicitly distinguishes their character (tropos) from their logoi (368b).
64 Throughout his speech Glaucon makes it clear that he does not agree with the views he is expressing (e.g. 358c, 
359b, 360c5,360c8,360d2,360d4,361e). Adeimantus does likewise (367a).
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ideas about justice. Socrates' brand o f argument in book 1 is essentially critical and negative, and 
as such is not a successful source o f positive moral conviction. Even Polemarchus learns only to 
criticize (cf, 335e).
Like Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus demand a substantial exposition o f Socrates' 
own views on justice. A convincing defence o f justice requires some positive substitute for 
Thrasymachus' position, some substantive advice on "how to live the most profitable life" (344e, 
cf. 352d). The brothers make die case for injustice as vehementiy as possible in order to elicit this 
kind o f response (358bcd, 367ab). Glaucon wants to hear such an account from Socrates in 
particular (358d), and Adeimantus regards him as having a special responsibility to provide one, 
because he (Socrates) has devoted his life to this question (367d, 506b). Adeimantus even links 
Socrates with other self-styled "praisers o f justice", all o f whom have failed to provide young men 
like him self with a satisfactory account o f justice and its consequences (366d-67a). The brothers 
are thus challenging not only the arguments o f book 1, but the efficacy o f Socrates' method 
generally as a means o f discovering and teaching moral truth. The elenctic Socrates is accustomed 
to scrutinizing the lives o f others, but now his own way o f life is on trial. This time the jury is 
composed not o f hostile or indifferent fellow-citizens, but o f men who share his philosophical 
concerns, including several talented and impressionable youths whose own lives may hang in the 
balance.
Book 1 concludes with Socrates declaring that they must find out what justice is before 
investigating what it is like (354b). The question and the methodological stricture are both typical 
of the elenctic dialogues. But after Glaucon and Adeimantus have issued their challenge at the 
beginning o f book 2, the question is pursued quite differently, and the methodological stricture 
abandoned.^ Plato makes Socrates voice positive and sustained ideas concerning the nature o f 
justice, thus tacitly granting some legitimacy not only to Glaucon and Adeimantus' dissatisfaction, 
but to Thrasymachus' complaints about the negativity o f the elenchus. Once Socrates turns to a 
new method, and starts to develop his own substantial theories, Thrasymachus is converted into an 
attentive, interested and even friendly listener (450a; cf. 498cd).°6 Positive and successful 
dialectic requires cooperative interlocutors, but conversely, an intransigent interlocutor is more 
likely to cooperate when his own legitimate concerns are addressed. In book 1 Socrates adapted 
his manner, but not his method, to each respondent. Now he has conformed much more 
drastically and successfully to Thrasymachus' needs.
In their challenge to Socrates, then, Glaucon and Adeimantus not only question the 
adequacy o f his arguments, but cast doubt on certain aspects o f his method. Just as their speeches 
purport to restate Thrasymachus' philosophical position, their dissatisfaction with book 1 endorses 
some o f his complaints against the Socratic method, in particular its negativity and its exploitation 
o f the interlocutor's philosophical weaknesses. Their admirable phusis and firm convictions 
enhance the significance o f this dissatisfaction. That such philosophically talented interlocutors 
take Thrasymachus' ideas seriously shows the extent o f the threat he poses. That they find 
Socrates' refutation inadequate poses serious questions about the efficacy o f his method. That they 
adopt Thrasymachus' own method—the long rhetorical discourse—suggests that Socrates' rejection 
o f such methods was at best premature. The gadfly turns out to bean inadequate teacher not only 
for the ill-tempered sophist, but for Plato's brothers as well.
Glaucon and Adeimantus' dissatisfaction with Socrates’ methods, combined with Plato's 
own change o f tactics, also suggests another kind o f criticism o f book 1. In that book, Plato 
represents Thrasymachus’ response to the slipperiness o f Socrates’ arguments not as a legitimate
65 Cf. Annas Republic 39.
66 This may be in part attributed to Socrates' gentleness and good will (so Patterson 341-2), but his gentleness 
accomplishes little in book 1, where Thrasymachus remains harshly sarcastic to the end (354a).
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uneasiness» but as crass and offensive rudeness which discredits the sophist personally. He 
allows Socrates to exploit his role as narrator to portray Thrasymachus as a contemptible beast, 
while at the same time subjecting him to an editorial mockery which belittles his objections (e.g. 
336b, d, 344d).67 Socrates also interprets his interlocutor’s motives for us, telling us, for 
example, that Thrasymachus has been "made angry by the logos" (336d)—when otherwise we 
might be forgiven for supposing that he had been made angry by Socrates. Later he informs us 
that Thrasymachus’ reluctance to speak was a pretence, when he "clearly" wanted to show off 
(338a). This kind o f interpretation o f the sophist's motives undermines the legitimacy o f his rage 
at what he experiences as philosophical sharp practice.
In response to Thrasymachus' other main charge, that his method is too negative, Socrates 
intimates that he would have given a positive definition o f justice if  he could, but that 
Thrasymachus prevented him (337abc, 337e, 339ab). Plato thus deploys Thrasymachus in such a 
way as to suggest that Socrates does have a positive account to give, even though this sits uneasily 
with his habitual claim to know nothing (cf. 337e, 354c). Once again Plato uses literary means (a 
blocking character) to evade a serious methodological challenge. In both cases, the resources o f 
dramatic characterization rather than philosophical argument are mobilized to exonerate Socrates by 
belittling and discrediting his opponent.
But the intervention o f Glaucon and Adeimantus suggests that any such criticisms o f  
Socrates should be evaluated independently o f the character o f those who utter them. By 
introducing his brothers as talented, eloquent and good-natured spokesmen for injustice, Plato 
implicitly criticizes not only Socratic practice, but his own literary practice in representing it. 
Socrates him self may not be guilty o f dialectical dishonesty, but Plato may still be guilty o f  
allowing him too easy a victory. It is equally unfair to give Socrates a respondent who caves in too 
easily, like Polemarchus (cf.336c), and a feisty but dialectically incompetent opponent like 
Thrasymachus. As Glaucon puts it, the silencing o f Thrasymachus is merely an appearance o f 
persuasion (357ab), for Plato has allowed him to be prematurely "charmed like a snake" (358b).
It is also unfair to counter unpalatable ideas by discrediting the personality o f the 
messenger. The literary strategy o f book 1 suggested that Thrasymachus' peculiarly offensive 
character is inseparable from his ethics. But according to Plato's brothers, it is not just 
Thrasymachus who holds such views, but all kinds o f ordinary people as w ell. They link 
Thrasymachus and his ideas (358b, 367a, 367c) with the anonymous multitude o f those who value 
justice only for its consequences (358a, 358c2, c6, 358c, 361e, 366b), including fathers and 
guardians (362e), ordinary people and their leaders (366b), begging priests (364b-e) and poets 
(363e etc), ancient heroes and even Socrates him self (366de). The brothers blur the distinctions 
between a range o f different ethical positions, but by doing so they link Thrasymachus with the 
consequentialism o f ordinary inoffensive people such as Cephalus.®* Such views therefore cannot 
be impugned by focusing on the personal unpleasantness o f this particular spokesman. Moreover 
this technique is unsuccessful. Thé presence o f Cleitophon shows that Thrasymachus has 
admirers despite his deplorable manners (cf. Cleit. 410c), and even Glaucon and Adeimantus are 
subject to his influence. Plato therefore offers us retrospectively a new way o f reading book 1, 
one which resists his own prejudicial use o f characterization. He makes Glaucon and Adeimantus 
re-present Thrasymachus' views as powerfully as possible, without ridicule, abuse, or any other 
attempt to discredit personally those who hold them. Only if  the sophist's views are successfully 
refuted under these conditions can we be sure that his anger at Socrates—as opposed to the 
argument—is not well founded.
67 Contrast 336b with the way Polemarchus breaks into die argument (33 Id). The difference is conveyed largely by 
editorial description. Cf. also e.g. 337a.
69 For the similarity between Cephalus and Thrasymachus cf. Murphy 2.
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III. N odding M andarins
Having said their say at the beginning o f book 2, Glaucon and Adeimantus quickly lapse into their 
familiarroles as the Rosencrantz and Guildenstem o f ancient philosophy. There is a marked shift 
away from Plato's earlier dramatic style, with its full and lively characterization. Despite the 
occasional touch o f color, none o f the speakers is richly or idiosyncratically characterized. 
Glaucon and Adeimantus become for the most part indistinguishable yes-men. Socrates him self 
becomes less ironic, elusive and provocative in manner. Though he remains committed to 
cooperative dialectic, he also becomes more paternalistic, didactic and uniformly earnest in tone. 
He no longer attacks the unfounded wisdom o f others, but presents himself, despite protestations 
of personal uncertainty, as a teacher trying to demonstrate his ideas (e.g. 392d, 595c5). He lays 
claim to "keener vision" than his interlocutors, and they in turn are happy to acknowledge his 
intellectual superiority (595c-96a; cf. 533a). All three o f them agree that the task o f defending 
justice belongs to Socrates.71 The enterprise has become unabashedly hierarchical, and this is 
reflected in Plato's use o f literary form. Socrates' style becomes largely expository, punctuated by 
expressions o f formulaic agreement from his respondents.
Despite this assymetry, however, the atmosphere remains collaborative. Since all the 
participants are now committed to the same methods and goals, their dialectical interaction is no 
longer agonistic, in contrast to Socrates' conversation with Thrasymachus in book 1 (cf. 
474ab).72 Glaucon and Adeimantus share Socrates' interests and convictions, they do not get 
affronted, and they never seem to weary o f hearing him talk. Their own positive contribution is 
slight, but Socrates still treats them as full collaborators in the argument, eliciting their agreement at 
every step, and attributing even the most outlandish ideas to them as well as himself. The brothers 
accept this, with only the occasional trace o f hesitation or self-consciousness.75 Even at their most 
passive, then, Socrates' respondents remain implicated in the argument by their acquiescence.
This is an important survival from the earlier Socratic method, but it imposes little 
restriction on Socrates' creativity, now that he is exploring his own ideas with the help o f 
sympathetic and intelligent interlocutors. Rather than hampering Socrates, Glaucon and 
Adeimantus play the role o f cheer-leaders, encouraging him in his daunting task, (hawing him out 
on obscure points, and preventing him from getting away with things.'^ The question is no 
longer how Socrates can best aid the interlocutor by clarifying his ideas, but how the interlocutor 
can best aid Socrates by answering, as Glaucon puts it, "more harmoniously than another" (474a; 
cf. 475e, 595b).77 it is this kind o f sympathetic support that enables Socrates to run the risk o f 
the exposure entailed by positive discourse (cf. 473e-74b, 450a-51b), the same risk that 
Thrasymachus jeered at him for avoiding (336c, 337e, 338b). His highly speculative and 
controversial ideas are greeted with support and admiration rather than the sceptical questioning o f 
the elenchus.
But Glaucon and Adeimantus are not entirely uncritical. From time to time they slip into 
their earlier role o f devil's advocate (e.g. 419a, 487bcd). This enables them to voice the objections
71 Cf. 358d, 367d, 368bc, 427de, 449b-50a, 506b.
72 Cf. Annas Republic 59.
73 E.g. 371c, 372a, 381c, 394d, 398e-99a, 400a, 402d.
75 Cf. 389a, 396b 10/c4,432d, 475a, 597a8-9.
76 E.g. 369b, 374e, 376cd, 427de, 449b-51b, 471c-72b, 473ab.
77 Cf. Meno 57de, Euthvd. 282c, Tht. 185e, Parm. 137b.
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o f ordinary people without personal commitment, and so rasure that their habitual agreement does 
not allow Socrates to evade the larger challenge posed at the beginning o f book 2. Only in book 9 
does Glaucon finally surrender on behalf o f die champion o f injustice (590a). The brothers also 
voice occasional objections o f their own (e.g. 372cd), but never in a hostile or personally offensive 
manner. Such friendly objections are entirely proper to the dialectical character, suggesting as they 
do close engagement and intellectual vigor. Hato uses these moments to facilitate the development 
o f the argument. Glaucon's objection to the "city o f pigs" (372cd), for example, is not really an 
obstacle, but prompts the necessary further development o f the ideal state. And after making such 
objections, the brothers always accept Socrates' further explanations. Their more frequent--and 
often well justified-failures to catch the drift o f his argument show that they have been paying 
attention, while obliging Socrates to clarify and develop his ideas.
These simultaneous changes in Plato’s dramatic style and Socrates' dialectical method may 
be viewed as a response to the limitations o f the elenchus, some o f which emerged from book 1. 
One o f the most serious o f these problems with the earlier method was its negativity. As Guthrie 
and many others have suggested, the move towards positive exposition prompted Plato to provide 
Socrates with a broader canvas on which to develop his ideas. But this alone is not enough to 
account for the stylistic changes. The construction o f the ideal state could have been a lively, 
cooperative venture, with real objections raised and discussed, and real contributions from several 
individualized characters. Instead, Hato makes little effort to differentiate the interlocutors and 
seems to willfully bypass opportunities for them to shine (e.g. 375d).
What made the earlier dramatic style uniquely appropriate to the Socratic method, however, 
was the personal character o f the elenchus, its rootedness in the individual character o f each 
interlocutor and their personal interactions with Socrates. As Hato moves away from this method, 
the lively characterization o f the earlier style is no longer necessary. Since Socrates is no longer 
engaged in refuting ideas as held by particular persons, the proper representation o f the argument 
no longer requires individual characterization o f the respondents. Indeed, as Hato abandons the 
elenchus, the personal dramatic style becomes not only irrelevant but a positive liability. For 
individual characterization privileges the kind o f personal idiosyncrasy that interferes with 
philosophical progress and undermines the universality o f the argument.
It is the elenctic Socrates’ preoccupation with the particular which causes at least some o f 
his failures. His method is rooted in the scrutiny o f the individual soul, in the optimistic hope that 
each in turn can be converted to the philosophic life. If he constantly fails, and succeeds primarily 
in alienating others, that is because his "testing" (a basic meaning o f elenchost is ironically one 
which shows up the particular weaknesses o f character and intellect that incapacitate most people 
for such a life. His egalitarian search for the potential wisdom in respondents o f all kinds seems 
doomed to failure.^ It also distracts him from developing his own ideas and making the most o f 
his unparallelled philosophical skill and creativity. The method o f Plato's later Socrates thus 
becomes not only more impersonal, but more didactic, authoritarian and hierarchical. Socrates is 
no longer testing idiosyncratic individuals for their philosophical potential, but trying to construct a 
positive argument o f his own. He has been wasting his time talking to just anyone he happens to 
meet. He needs as interlocutors not flawed individuals but talented and sympathetic philosophy 
students, whose characters will show under what circumstances such positive progress can take 
place.
This new kind o f dialectic still calls in principle for a sympathetic response to the individual 
interlocutor. But in practice, as we have seen, positive and cooperative dialectic calls for qualities 
which militate against individuality. If Socrates’ respondents have all the necessary qualities for 
success at dialectic, he no longer needs to tailor his method to their particular needs. We must
79 For Socrates' willingness to tackle anyone indiscriminately cf. Apol. 29d, 30a.
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therefore content ourselves with cardboad renditions o f mutually interchangeable philosophy 
students. That is why Glaucon and Adeimantus are, as characters, virtually indistinguishable. 
What matters about them is not their idiosyncrasies, but their philosophical receptiveness, which is 
no longer a personal matter but appears identically in both o f them. (Perhaps it was to make this 
point that Plato bothered to use two interlocutors at all.) If Glaucon and Adeimantus are 
uninteresting, it is not because Plato no longer cares about the qualities required for successful 
philosophizing, but because he has come to see those qualities as essentially uniform, and has 
become correspondingly suspicious o f the kind o f personal idiosyncrasies with which the elenctic 
Socrates wrestled in his opponents.
In speaking o f Glaucon and Adeimantus' philosophical talents, however, I have neglected 
one important fact--their lackof intellectual flair and creativity. They have the necessary character 
traits to serve as useful interlocutors for the newly creative Socrates. They also display many o f 
the intellectual qualities required for dialectic, suchas quick comprehension and a good memory. 
But they are not yet ready for the higher reaches o f dialectic. 87 As Socrates approaches the topic 
o f the Good, he worries about misleading his interlocutors with inadequate explanations (506c- 
507a; cf. 504b-e). When he reaches a point where Glaucon will be able to follow him no further, 
he cuts his discourse short (533a; cf. 534b). Further dialectical progress requires rigorous 
propaedeutic studies in mathematics and astronomy (533a). Socrates' bland and receptive students 
have yet to graduate from cheer-leading to creative autonomy. They have reached the limits o f their 
current comprehension, and in doing so have finally imposed some constraints upon Socrates' 
philosophizing.
The fact that Glaucon and Adeimantus have so little to contribute reflects Plato's pessimism 
about the natural, social and educational conditions which may succeed in fostering the growth o f a 
true philosopher. They have made a promising start, but the argument o f the Republic, as well as 
its form, indicates just how far they still have to go. Yet even if  they have not yet gained access to 
the truth, they still exemplify the character needed by one who wishes to work towards it. As 
such, the reader can and should identify with them and emulate their philosophical virtues, 
including the determination to keep on striving for something that may lie  forever beyond our 
reach. Glaucon and Adeimantus themselves may perhaps seem too acquiescent—too stuck at the 
primary stage o f the guardians' education—ever to attain that goal. But even their most wooden 
responses invite resistance from the reader, by leaving us space to question what they 
unhesitatingly accept. Even in the later books, then, Plato's use o f dramatic form helps to lure us 
beyond simple acquiescence to pedagogical authority. In doing so, it invites us to identify with our 
other character model, Socrates himself, who exemplifies a higher level o f philosophical creativity 
and insight By offering us both teacher and students as models, Plato displaces onto his dramatic 
characters the tension between authoritarian dogmatism and creative autonomy which pervades his 
work.
Glaucon and Adeimantus, then, play a more interesting role than is at first sight apparent. 
However much we may regret the replacement o f the colorful interlocutors who inhabit book 1 
with the bland yes-men o f books 2-10, we must not underestimate the philosophical significance o f 
Plato’s changing cast o f characters.
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